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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
Although Petitioners, ReDigi, Inc., et al., have consented to the filing of this amicus brief by OmniQ, Respondent, Capitol Records, Inc., has not. OmniQ
therefore moves pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
37.2(b), for leave to file this amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioners in the above captioned matter for
the following reasons.
OmniQ is the assignee of patent-pending inventions that would rival those of ReDigi, and which provide a technologically different manner of shifting a
work from one material object to another without reproduction. OmniQ’s method was not before the District Court or the Second Circuit, however, and the
Second Circuit’s sweeping language threatens to stifle
the development of OmniQ’s method to the detriment
of the public. OmniQ believes it would be helpful for
this Court to understand the broader impact of the
Second Circuit’s holding, and why its error warrants
certiorari.
OmniQ’s patent-pending inventions were developed following extensive legal research, and rely on
case law that was never considered below or in the instant Petition. OmniQ can show that the Second Circuit ignored the plain meaning of “reproduction,”
choosing instead a definition that directly conflicts
with the plain language of the Copyright Act (when
read as a whole) and the English-language interpretation of “reproduction” adopted by this Court and by the
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Supreme Court of Canada (relying, in part, on U.S. case
law). Also, OmniQ can demonstrate why the Second
Circuit’s decision usurps the role of Congress by baselessly assuming that well-established jurisprudence in
the United States and Canada with respect to the “analog” transfer of the fixation of a work from one material object to another would not carry over to a “digital”
transfer of the same work from one material object to
another. That assumption is in direct contravention of
the Copyright Act’s plain language intended to apply
to fixation “by any method now known or later developed,” (§ 101 definition of “copies” and “phonorecords”).
By holding that established jurisprudence does not apply to this particular method that was later developed,
the Second Circuit has, instead, developed a judicial
“solution” to a problem best left to Congress, if it exists
at all.
OmniQ was established to find a solution to the
impact digital technology is having on the public benefits from the “first sale doctrine” and Sections 109 and
202 of the Copyright Act. The partnership includes veterans of the home video rental industry who were seeing the number of films available to the public shrink
dramatically as the motion picture industry shifts
from rental of physical DVDs (an exercise of the distribution right that is subject to Section 109 and the first
sale doctrine) to digital delivery of the same work, but
to a material object (e.g., the customer’s computer)
owned by the customer, and that is not readily redistributable without parting with the entirety of the
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hard drive’s library of lawfully made copies of unrelated works.
Recognizing that a “copy and delete” means of
transferring a copy from one person to another might
infringe the reproduction right, the OmniQ invention
navigates the path set out in the U.S. Copyright Act to
move the work from one medium to another without
reproduction. The result preserves the secondary market available to owners of lawfully made copies created
by licensed reproduction to the owner’s material object
rather than by licensed reproduction to a plastic disc
shipped by truck to the new owner.
THEREFORE, OmniQ hereby requests that this
Court grant its Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus
Curiae and that the Court accept the attached proposed brief amicus curiae in support of the position of
Petitioners, ReDigi, et al.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN T. MITCHELL
Counsel of Record
INTERACTION LAW
1629 K Street NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 415-9213
john@interactionlaw.com
JUNE 11, 2019

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
OmniQ
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
OmniQ is a partnership among video industry veterans to develop a lawful means fulfilling the purpose
and effect of the “first sale doctrine” and Sections 109
and 202 of the U.S. Copyright Act by shifting the fixation of a work from one material object to another without reproduction.1 To that end, three of the partners
have filed patent applications teaching their method
(one of which has already been allowed).2
These inventions provide a secure way for works
fixed in one material object to be un-fixed in the original material object and re-fixed in a new material object, following well established United States case law
and Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence. The inventions prevent the first sale doctrine from becoming
a dead letter when lawfully made copies have been distributed on material objects that are no longer in use,3
1

Only Petitioners have consented to the filing of this brief.
Counsel for a party did not author this brief in whole or in part.
No person or entity other than Amicus Curiae and its partners
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief. The parties were notified ten days prior to the due
date of this brief of the intention to file.
2
Application No. 15/130,832, Digitally Lending Content
Without Reproduction, has been allowed. Application No.
15/130,825, Digitally Transferring Content Across Media Without
Reproduction, is still pending.
3
For example, motion pictures fixed on DVDs have been distributed by the millions, and the owners have a right to privately
perform them indefinitely, as well as to sell, gift, rent or lend
them, but DVD technology is quickly being supplanted by new
delivery methods, such that there are now fewer DVD players and
reduced ability to acquire or play the DVD. But if the work fixed
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or when the “distribution” is carried out by a licensed
reproduction, commonly referred to as a “download,” to
a material object on which perhaps thousands of other
works have been fixed, effectively nullifying the private and public benefits of the first sale doctrine given
that the only way to exercise the entitlement in Section
109 to lend, sell, rent or give away a particular lawfully
made copy of a movie fixed on a hard drive is to lend,
sell, rent or give away all of the thousands of other fixations residing on that hard drive.
The Second Circuit’s decision brings an end to the
benefits of the first sale doctrine whenever the lawfully
made copies and phonorecords are fixed on a single
material object along with the fixation of hundreds or
perhaps thousands of other works. By misinterpreting
the right to “re-produce” a work in copies and
phonorecords in a manner that applies even when no
additional copies are created, and by refusing to apply
longstanding “analog” jurisprudence to the “digital”
environment, as Congress intended, the decision below
robs the public of the benefits of digital commerce and
secondary sales, and puts the brakes on the progress
of science and the useful arts.
Abraham Lincoln could borrow law books when he
did not have the means to purchase them at the publisher’s first sale price, requiring only the consent of
in a DVD can be moved to a computer hard drive without reproduction, or from one hard drive to another, all of the economic
value to the copyright owner is preserved along with the public
benefit of secondary dissemination of the work without the copyright owner’s consent.
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the owner of the books, and not the consent of the
copyright owner. The lender needed only to pluck individual books from his library shelves and lend them to
Lincoln. In terms of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the book owner’s freedom to lend his books to
Lincoln furthered the interest in wide dissemination of
creative works of authorship.
Technological advances have allowed us to compress vast libraries onto a single material object, but
in the process has made it untenable to exercise this
important entitlement. No doubt Lincoln could not
have borrowed those books if the lender was required
to part with his entire library for the duration of the
single loan.
The outcome of this litigation could have a substantial impact on the public value of the first sale doctrine in advancing the constitutional purpose of the
Copyright Act. By preventing the development of technology to safely and securely move a fixation from one
material object to another without re-producing the
work in a copy or phonorecord, the decision below cripples the progress of science and the useful arts. The
entitlement of the owner to redistribute lawfully made
copies she owns also benefits the person who depends
upon secondary markets because the price of a new
pristine copy is out of reach. Although the technological advancements at issue here are not, technically, a
first sale doctrine issue, OmniQ seeks to keep alive the
benefits of the first sale doctrine by simply moving the
fixation from one material object to another, without
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reproduction. The Second Circuit’s ruling could outlaw
the use of any such technology.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Second Circuit’s holding contributes to a dramatic reduction in the availability of previously distributed and fully paid copies and phonorecords,
increases the cost of access – or forecloses it altogether
– for those persons most dependent upon secondary
markets, such as copies obtained by secondhand sale,
lending or gifting.
To arrive at this devastating result, the Second
Circuit misconstrued what constitutes a “copy” or
“phonorecord,” and ignored the plain meaning of the
word “reproduce” – by judicially eliminating the preface “re” – such that any fixation counts as a reproduction regardless whether there was any multiplication
of copies. It also failed to apply existing jurisprudence
allowing the transfer of a fixation from one material
object to another, choosing instead to exempt “digital”
fixations from established case law, creating sui generis treatment in the case of digital fixations.
In the music industry, members of the public are
more able to access any music of their choosing, thanks
to blanket licensing, statutory royalties and compulsory licensing. Those avenues do not exist for literary
or audiovisual works. With respect to the latter,
wherein lies OmniQ’s expertise, the public has already
lost access to vast libraries of motion pictures and
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other audiovisual works, simply because modern technological solutions like the one at issue here are lacking.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The Second Circuit Judicially Altered the
Plain Meaning of “Reproduce” in the Copyright Act

Subject to Sections 107-122, Section 106(1) of the
Copyright Act grants the author the exclusive right “to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords.” But the Second Circuit in effect substituted “produce” for “reproduce,” skirting the normal
English definition of the prefix “re.” That alteration of
the English language finds no purchase in the Copyright Act, where Congress clearly understood “reproduce” to mean to make additional copies. Plus, it is
contrary to this Court’s holding in White Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
A. There is no “reproduction” without
multiplication of copies
This Court addressed this question over a century
ago in White Music Publishing: “What is meant by a
copy? We have already referred to the common understanding of it as a reproduction or duplication of a
thing.” 209 U.S. 1, at 17 (emphasis added). “[I]t seems
evident that Congress has dealt with the tangible
thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with the
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Librarian of Congress, and wherever the words are
used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to the term in
its ordinary sense of indicating reproduction or duplication of the original.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
Building upon the requirement that there be some
additional copies in order to infringe the reproduction
right, it has become well established that moving the
fixation of a work from one material object to another
does not infringe the exclusive right to reproduce the
work in copies and phonorecords.
The seminal United States case is CM Paula Company v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973), which
involved chemically lifting the fixation of an image
from a greeting card, and moving it to a ceramic tile,
leaving the original material object – the card stock –
blank.
The process utilized by defendant that is now
in question results in the use of the original
image on a ceramic plaque; such process is not
a “reproduction or duplication”.
The Court believes that plaintiff ’s characterization of the print thus used as a decal is appropriate. Each ceramic plaque sold by
defendant with a Paula print affixed thereto
requires the purchase and use of an individual piece of artwork marketed by the plaintiff.
For example, should defendant desire to make
one hundred ceramic plaques using the identical Paula print, defendant would be required
to purchase one hundred separate Paula
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prints. The Court finds that the process here
in question does not constitute copying.
Id. at 191. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly
followed the Logan decision while echoing this Court’s
definition of “reproduce” in White Music Publishing:
there can be no reproduction if the fixation is simply
moved from one material object to another.
My colleague, Gonthier J., takes the position
that if the image were transferred from one
piece of paper to a different piece of paper
with no other “change”, there is a new “fixation” and that would be “reproduction”. But in
what way has the legitimate economic interest of the copyright holder been infringed?
The process began with a single poster and
ended with a single poster. The image “fixed”
in ink is the subject-matter of the intellectual
property and it was not reproduced. It was
transferred from one display to another. It is
difficult to envisage any intellectual content
let alone intellectual property embodied in the
piece of blank paper peeled away, or in the
piece of blank paper substituted for it. When
Raphaël’s Madonna di Foligno was lifted for
preservation purposes from its original canvas in 1799 under the direction of the chemist
Berthollet and fixed to a new canvas, the resulting work was considered to be no less an
original Raphaël.
Théberge, at 338. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit
Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 SCC 34
(Canada), at ¶ 38.

8
The historical scope of the notion of “reproduction” under the Copyright Act should be kept
in mind. As one would expect from the very
word “copyright”, “reproduction” is usually defined as the act of producing additional or new
copies of the work in any material form. Multiplication of the copies would be a necessary
consequence of this physical concept of “reproduction”.
Id. at ¶ 42. Commenting on the U.S. Copyright Act,
Justice Binnie noted,
The U.S. legislation expressly incorporates a
definition of “derivative work,” as happens for
example when a cartoon character is turned
into a puppet, or a tragic novel is turned into
a musical comedy. In such circumstances
there is, in a sense, a “production” rather than
a reproduction. However, the examples of
what might be called derivative works listed
in s. 3(1)(a) to (e) of our Act are consistent with
the notion of reproduction because they all
imply the creation of new copies or manifestations of the work. In the application of the ink
transfer method, however, there is no derivation, reproduction or production of a new and
original work which incorporates the respondent’s artistic work.
Even if one were to consider substitution of a
new substrate to be a “fixation”, the fact remains that the original poster lives on in the
“re-fixated” poster. There is no multiplication
and fixation alone is not an infringement of
the original work.
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Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. The court below failed to recognize that
the purpose of the reproduction right is solely to prohibit the replication of the work into additional copies
without the consent of the copyright owner.
B. Congress understood “reproduction” to
require multiplication
Congress did not grant an exclusive right to “produce” copies of a work. The copyright only covers reproduction. The definitions contained in § 101 demonstrate that Congress understood “reproduce” to mean
an increase in the number of copies of the work rather
than every fixation of the work in a material object. In
defining “copies” as the fixation of a work onto a material object from which the work could be “perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated,” Congress
added an important caveat that was necessary to avoid
the untenable result that the distribution right would
not apply to the material object bearing the first fixation: “The term ‘copies’ includes the material object . . .
in which the work is first fixed.”4 That enlargement of
the reach of “copies” to include the original, un-reproduced fixation, would have been unnecessary if the
Second Circuit’s interpretation were correct. The
§ 106(1) right to “reproduce” the work in copies and
phonorecords does not include every fixation of a work
in a material object; it only includes every fixation that
4

The definition of “phonorecords” includes that same enlargement of scope to include the original, un-reproduced,
phonorecord: “The term ‘phonorecords’ includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.”
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results in an increase in the number of copies. Moving
the fixation from one material object to another is permissible. And, although these principles were developed in the world of “analog fixations,” Congress has
made clear that “digital fixations” should not be
treated any differently.
II.

Digital Fixations Deserve the Same Treatment as Analog Fixations

Over a century ago, this Court made clear that
courts should not judicially enlarge the scope of the
Copyright Act to reach new technologies not specifically addressed by the statute. It determined that although it might make sense for Congress to treat
perforated player piano rolls as copies of the musical
work, the courts should not simply presume that Congress would have intended the alteration.
It may be true that the use of these perforated
rolls, in the absence of statutory protection,
enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy
the use of musical compositions for which
they pay no value. But such considerations
properly address themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, branch of the government.
White Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company,
209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In § 101 of the current Act, Congress intended to future-proof copyright protection by
defining “copies” and “phonorecords” to include material objects in which the works are “fixed by any
method now known or later developed,” and from
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which the work can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Under this approach, Congress
intended perforations on paper, grooves in a vinyl record, magnetic impulses on tape, and digital impressions on a digital recording medium, to all be treated
the same as ink on paper. In essence, Congress took the
same approach as the Supreme Court of Canada took
when it upheld the principle of “technological neutrality.”
The Board’s conclusion that a separate, “communication” tariff applies to downloads of
musical works violates the principle of technological neutrality. This principle requires
that the Act apply equally between traditional
and more technologically advanced media
forms. There is no practical difference between buying a durable copy of the work in a
store, receiving a copy in the mail, or downloading an identical copy using the Internet.
ESA has already paid reproduction royalties
to the copyright owners for the video games.
Absent evidence of Parliamentary intent to
the contrary, we interpret the Act in a way
that avoids imposing an additional layer of
protections and fees based solely on the
method of delivery of the work to the end user.
To do otherwise would effectively impose a
gratuitous cost for the use of more efficient,
Internet-based technologies. The Internet
should be seen as a technological taxi that delivers a durable copy of the same work to the
end user. The traditional balance in copyright
between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works
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and obtaining a just reward for the creators of
those works should be preserved in the digital
environment.
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012
SCC 34, [2012] S.C.R. 231 at 232. But the Second Circuit departed from this sound approach, plucking the
concept of “digital files” out of thin air, and giving them
sui generis treatment. The Second Circuit’s approach
of treating the “digital files” as material objects would
be akin to saying that, in the case of a literary work
printed on paper, the material object is the ink rather
than the paper, and in the case of a sound recording on
a vinyl record, it is the grooves that are the material
objects, rather than the vinyl disc itself.
For example, the Second Circuit refers to “the resale of digital files containing sound recordings,” Pet.
App. at 3a, whereas § 101 defines “sound recordings”
as “works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” Similarly, the court below proclaims, “Today, Plaintiffs also
distribute their music in the form of digital files,” id.,
despite that the § 106(3) distribution right applies only
to copies and phonorecords, not “digital files.” With respect to whether a “digital file” can or cannot be a
phonorecord, the Second Circuit observed, “our understanding of the technology is limited, as is our ability
to appreciate the economic implications.” Id. at 14a,
n.10. Although it purported to “rule more narrowly”
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because of its limited understanding, id., the reality is
that its limited ability to understand the technology or
the economic implications impeded its ability to understand that a “digital file” on its own cannot be a
phonorecord. At issue is not whether the work was
fixed by means of a digital file, but whether the work
was fixed in a material object. “A copy must of necessity consist of some tangible material object upon
which the work is ‘fixed.’ ” Walker v. University Books,
Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
This Court should grant certiorari to address the
Second Circuit’s dramatic departure from the text of
the Copyright Act and this Court’s long-established explanation that to “copy” requires re-production or duplication.
III. 1960 Doesn’t Exist on Netflix
For most of our nation’s history, copyrighted works
have typically been published in discrete copies – material objects in which a single work, or a closely related collection of works – were fixed. The Copyright
Act’s sharp distinction between the intangible copyrighted work and the tangible copy of the work (§ 202)
could be given full effect in commerce, together with
the “first sale doctrine” and the Copyright Act’s express
limitation on the distribution right (§ 109), which entitles owners of lawfully made copies to redistribute
them without the consent of the copyright holder. (Sections 109 and 202 of the Copyright Act of 1976 were
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originally codified together in § 41 of the Copyright Act
of 1909, and in § 27 of the Copyright Act of 1947.)
So-called “digital copies” have been around since
the days of the music CD and DAT (digital audio tape).
Music CDs have been manufactured commercially in
the United States since the September 21, 1984, release of Bruce Springsteen’s Born in the U.S.A., dubbed
by CBS as “The First CBS Records Compact Disc Made
in the U.S.A.”5 That same day, The Edison CD Sampler
was issued from the same plant.6
Even back then, The Edison CD Sampler betrayed
the publisher’s effort to restrict uses that are statutorily placed beyond the copyright owner’s control. The
front face of the digital copy (or “digital phonorecord,”
to be precise) carried a legal warning resembling the
one struck down by the Supreme Court in BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908): “FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY – NOT FOR SALE.” Although
it is lawful for the owner of the CD to ignore the attempted nullification of § 109 with respect to digital
copies fixed in discrete material objects (see, e.g.,
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th
Cir. 2011)), the growing preference for copyright holders to deliver the works digitally as reproductions
5

Keith Hirsch, The very rare “red” Bruce Springsteen Born
in The U.S.A. CD, KEITH HIRSCH’S CD RESOURCE, March 14,
2015, available at http://www.keithhirsch.com/the-very-rare-redbruce-springsteen-born-in-the-u-s-a-cd.
6
Keith Hirsch, The Edison CD Sampler, KEITH HIRSCH’S CD
RESOURCE, March 30, 2008, available at http://www.keithhirsch.
com/the-edison-cd-sampler.
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“downloaded” to the copy owner’s own hard drive is already undermining the benefits of the first sale doctrine and its codification since 1909. The delivery
technology itself is being used, intentionally or not, to
eliminate secondary markets for sales, rentals and
gifts that millions of Americans depend upon daily, because they cannot afford the price of a “new” copy.
The Second Circuit’s holding is not limited to
phonorecords of sound recordings. Both the Second
Circuit’s holding and OmniQ’s patent-pending technology would apply to literary works and audiovisual
works as well. With respect to the latter, the public’s
access to movies is shrinking dramatically. While there
may be enough movies available to find something
worth watching, the breadth of choice in movies was
many times higher 20 years ago than it is today.
In their heyday, neighborhood video stores might
have carried tens of thousands of titles. Today, relatively few video rental stores remain. See, e.g., Laura
M. Holson, Scarecrow Video Has Survived This Long.
Can It Hang On? NEW YORK TIMES, March 18, 2019,
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/
business/scarecrow-video-seattle.html (“The store in
Seattle has more than 132,000 titles, many of them not
available on the internet, or anywhere else.”). Even
Netflix, which had been a fierce competitor of local
video retailers with its mail order DVD rentals and
deep catalog of older movies, has been dramatically
cutting back on its selections as it shifts its business
model to streaming movies on demand. As observed by
Zach Schonfeld, Netflix, Streaming Video And The Slow
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Death Of The Classic Film, NEWSWEEK (online), Sept.
15, 2017, at 6:10 AM, available at http://www.news
week.com/2017/09/22/netflix-streaming-movies-classics664512.html, “in the vast world of Netflix streaming,
1960 doesn’t exist.” Schonfeld goes on to note that 1960
was the year Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho was released,
along with Billy Wilder’s The Apartment, and Stanley
Kubrick’s Spartacus:
There’s one movie from 1961 available to
watch (the original Parent Trap) and one selection from 1959 (Compulsion), but not a single film from 1960. It’s like it never happened.
There aren’t any movies from 1963 either. Or
1968, 1955 or 1948. There are no Hitchcock
films on Netflix. No classics from Sergio Leone
or François Truffaut. When Debbie Reynolds
died last Christmas week, grieving fans had
to turn to Amazon Video for Singin’ in the
Rain and Susan Slept Here. You could fill a
large film studies textbook with what’s not
available on Netflix.
Id. Of course, Amazon Video has its own limited selection, and having to subscribe to multiple services just
to try to cobble together a decent choice is costly to the
public, whose local video stores did not charge a
monthly admission fee whether they rented anything
or not. Schonfeld describes the Netflix selection as
“abominable,” noting that, at the time he checked on
the ever-rotating selection of titles (due to short-term
licensing) on its streaming platform, there were just
43 movies made before 1970. Only 25 movies from the
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pre-1950 era were available to the more than
100,000,000 global subscribers.
Stephen Prince, a cinema studies professor at Virginia Tech, observed, “Now we see the danger inherent
in this change – an emphasis on mainstream, contemporary movies has replaced what had been a broad archive of world cinema. . . . Convenience biases viewers
toward mainstream fare and makes films of the past
or from other cultures less visible.” Id. “My students
are heavily biased toward what’s new and what can be
streamed on portable devices,” Prince says. “What isn’t
available to stream essentially doesn’t exist.” Id.
Schonfeld paraphrases the Swedish film scholar, Jan
Olsson, “Streaming rights are expensive, and Netflix
probably doesn’t think the audience for old films is big
enough to make it worthwhile.” Id.
Librarian (and writer) Rachel Paige King decried
the shift to a system based on contractual permissions
rather than the operation law:
So, as the technology to disseminate all kinds
of art and information becomes more sophisticated, so too does the means and the motive
to restrict access. If entertainment industry
executives are smart (and they are) they’ll
make sure that streaming video turns out to
be a whole lot more expensive for consumers
than home DVD rental.
Id. And she is right. That is exactly what is happening.
“The end result,” says Schonfeld, “is a paltry, pathetic
catalog of older films shackled by copyright law. It’s a
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strange conundrum: The internet promises a century’s
worth of multimedia output at your fingertips but
ruthlessly privileges whatever got released yesterday.
Some films have been left behind in obsolete format
hell.” Id.
As major streaming services become filmmakers
in an effort to both compete using “exclusives” and
avoid the need to pay licensing fees, many films do not
get a theatrical release open to everyone, or even DVD
distribution, before being confined to “exclusive” availability on a single streaming service. “Frankly, this is
why I’m keeping all my DVDs,” says film critic, Leonard Maltin. “And it’s a pain in the neck, because they
take up space. But I don’t trust the cloud. And I don’t
trust the marketplace to maintain titles that are in
some cases obscure or not terribly commercial.”
“There are some movies you basically have to
break the law to see.” Id. (quoting classic cinema blogger, Nora Fiore). And that is what OmniQ seeks to correct by finding a technological solution to what will
otherwise become a broken copyright system. Millions
upon millions of movies have already been reproduced
in copies, sold, and lawfully distributed or downloaded,
and are currently gathering dust in warehouses, basements and living room shelves, or taking up needed
space on the owner’s hard drive, while the movies that
had previously been fixed in DVDs or hard drives cannot be watched on streaming services, or can only be
seen by paying the “new” price of a download, if available.
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The first sale doctrine is in serious risk of irrelevance if the Copyright Act is interpreted such that the
very technology that enables on-demand reproductions
(downloads) of works onto the customer’s hard drives
also allows every copyright holder to require each individual to purchase the “new” copy. The millions of
people who depend upon the used, second-hand goods
are being left out of the promise of Article I, Section 8
of the U.S. Constitution.
Even the motion picture studios that own the
copyrights understand that there is no substantive difference, with respect to their reproduction and distribution rights, between digital delivery and physical
delivery. In 2001, when Congress was grappling with
the tax consequences of digital delivery, the Motion
Picture Association of America addressed the question
of whether the delivery of a movie through e-commerce
networks (now known as electronic sell-through, or
EST) should be considered trade in goods or trade in
services, MPAA’s Vice President for Trade & Federal
Affairs gave the following example:
If a consumer were to place a telephone order
for a DVD of the film “Finding Forrester” and
have a copy of that DVD delivered to his house
on a UPS truck, that is a “goods” transaction.
Likewise, if the same consumer ordering a
copy of the same DVD on his/her computer
and had the same content delivered digitally
and downloaded from his computer to a writeable DVD – that is still a “goods” transaction.
The only difference is that a digital network
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instead of a delivery van provided the transportation from the retailer to the consumer.
Testimony of Bonnie J.K. Richardson before the House
Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection, May 22, 2001, prepared statement at 12. Notably, Ms. Richardson referred to the digital delivery as being “of the same
DVD” rather than “the same work that was on the
DVD.” She is right. As early as 2001, the movie industry already saw “the DVD” almost like the literary
world sees “a book”. There is no “book” or “DVD” in the
Copyright Act. The value of the literary work of authorship is in the ability to read it, not in the quality of the
paper upon which it is printed or whether it is on a
Kindle reader. Likewise, “a DVD” tells the consumer
that “the movie” is in digital form on a particular type
of material object, but for all practical purposes, the
consumer will get just as much enjoyment from watching the movie from a DVD inserted into a DVD player
as watching it from a computer hard drive. In Copyright Act terms, the UPS delivery involves reproduction onto a medium that has not yet been distributed,
whereas digital delivery over the Internet involves reproduction onto a medium that has already been distributed to the person receiving the download.7

7

See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430, 434 (6th Cir.
1991) (“[C]opyright law does not forbid an individual from renting
or selling a copy of a copyrighted work which was lawfully obtained or lawfully manufactured by that individual.” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 1986)
(same).
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It is error, therefore, to give a restrictive interpretation to the Copyright Act, which undermines the
freedom of the owner of a lawfully made copy or
phonorecords to pass it on to someone else less able to
afford the new copy, and without needing permission
from the copyright owner to do so. The only certain result of the below is that the progress of science and the
useful arts will suffer dramatically.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the instant petition for certiorari.
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